Exactly six years
ago, UN Security Council Resolution 1559 was passed, but the problem of
Lebanon’s illegitimate arms remains – and has got worse – with the
weapons that should be used to resist Israel being turned on fellow
Lebanese. Last week’s fighting in Bourj Abi Haidar reminded people in no
uncertain terms of the events of May 7, 2008, which, while alarming in
and of themselves, everyone thought had been resolved by the subsequent
Doha Accord and the imposition of a national-unity government.
However, it seems that any incident, individual or political, can
ignite sectarian strife and threaten the peace – not to mention the
people – of the country’s mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods. Upon the
request of residents and civil-society groups, the campaign to disarm Beirut was initiated by concerned political and official figures.
Hopes for the success of such a campaign are scant, as the counter
campaign, launched by Hezbollah and its allies, is aggressive and
threatening to Prime Minister Saad Hariri personally, hinting at efforts
to topple his government.
Previous attempts at disarming the militias in Beirut and across
Lebanon, since the end of the civil war onward, have been unsuccessful,
with the real decision-making resting with the various parties and their
regional partners.
We all know that Hezbollah and pro-Syrian factions such as Al-Ahbash
will not disarm. Hezbollah made it clear in 2008 that its priority is
its arms and that resistance is an excuse to acquire arms. In fact, in
May 2008, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah had the
nerve to tell Beirutis and the Druze of the Mountain that his offensive
action was done to defend his party’s weapons, using the infamous phrase
that still rings in the minds of many Lebanese: “The arms are there to
defend the arms.”
Simply, the political will is not there, and the Lebanese state and
its institutions are not strong enough to impose any disarmament of any
group. It is a familiar story. Following the Taif Accord of 1990,
Hezbollah – along with pro-Syrian factions such as Amal and the Syrian
Socialist National Party (SSNP) – kept its weapons as it was deemed the
national Resistance because a sizeable chunk of Lebanon was under
Israeli occupation. Ten years after the liberation of the South, nothing
has changed, even though, over the same period, Hezbollah’s arms have
not only been part of the national debate, they are seen as an obstacle
to full Lebanese statehood.
In 2005, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri and the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, an
anti-Syrian government was formed, and Hezbollah felt its arms were
under threat. Hezbollah’s plan, which only became obvious to the
Lebanese much later, was to work to control Lebanon’s state institutions
in order to protect its arms.
The party presented itself as the legitimate successor of Syria in
Lebanon, and, after the 2006 July War, its campaign against Lebanese
institutions grew more aggressive. The parliament was closed for almost
two years, the opposition sit-in closed off the business and shopping
district of downtown Beirut, while the Grand Serail, the seat of
government, was besieged by armed Hezbollah and Amal members.
When the government of former PM Fouad Siniora did not cave to the
will of an armed opposition and even sought to dismantle its illegal
phone network (a move that fell within its remit), Hezbollah attacked
West Beirut and the Druze Mountain, killing and injuring many civilians.
It was a watershed moment. The Doha Accord stopped both the fighting
and the sit-in and imposed a national-unity government, the precedent of
which wiped out the victory of the March 14 coalition in the 2009
parliamentary elections, which saw the formation of another consensus
cabinet.
Since then, Hezbollah has controlled all state institutions, the
streets of Beirut, decisions of war and peace, and has shaped the daily
lives of all Lebanese who have had to live with the ever-present veiled
threat of intimidation that the party hangs over the nation. But after
the May events also started an arms race, especially in Sunni-Shia
neighborhoods, where the population knew it could not rely on the state
and had to protect itself.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese army has been wary in its dealings with all
the different Lebanese factions, not only because of the traditional
sensitivity of Lebanese politics, but also because the army could be,
and has been, divided along sectarian lines. It is a situation it must
monitor carefully.
The Doha Accord calmed the local situation, but this stability has
been extremely precarious and subject to new political dynamics, such as
when Syria decides to send Hezbollah a message,
leading to a new round of bloody clashes that could start in a mixed
area like Bourj Abi Haidar, but spiral out of control elsewhere in the
country.
Then again, the Doha Accord also stipulated the banning of the
“internal” use of illegal weapons. And yet what happened last week in
Bourj Abi Haidar was a big blow to the Doha Accord. But can we also say
it was also a blow to the national-unity government, which was part of
the same equation?
Even if we do, who decides the meaning of it or how to implement that logic? Obviously, not the Lebanese.
So now what? This is the question that is most prominent among the
Lebanese. The Future parliamentary bloc, led by PM Hariri, called for
Beirut to be arms-free, but immediately afterward a campaign against him
was set into motion, even though other March 14 figures went further
than Hariri by calling for the disarmament of the whole of Lebanon.
The proposal, although hopeless from the start, caused concern on
Hezbollah’s side, because the accumulation of such initiatives over a
period of time could eventually lead somewhere, especially in a more
mature or stronger political environment. Meanwhile, the question is not
whether Beirut is going to be disarmed or not; it is more about who
will control Beirut’s streets: Hezbollah or Syria. The Syrian regime
wants to come back by creating security incidents and leveraging
Hezbollah’s vulnerable situation due to the threat of indictments from
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Hezbollah, for its part, is
trying to resist.
Immediately after the clashes, Hezbollah compensated those who
suffered damages, hoping to buy people’s silence. It might be able to do
so for a while, but something else will surely happen, such as an STL
indictment, later to reignite the anger.
The security incidents will no doubt continue, and the political
debate regarding Beirut’s disarmament will stop once something else
topples it off the national agenda. In the meantime, the Lebanese will
carry on living with the “divine” weapons of the “divine” party that
achieved the “divine” victory in 2006.
Divinity: how can anyone challenge it?
Hanin Ghaddar is managing editor of NOW Lebanon