Whatever terminology you choose,
the details of dozens of their specific operations -- and how they
regularly went badly wrong -- have been revealed for the first time in
the mass of secret U.S. military and intelligence documents published by
the website Wikileaks in July to a storm of news coverage and official protest.
Representing a form of U.S. covert warfare now on the rise, these teams
regularly make more enemies than friends and undermine any goodwill
created by U.S. reconstruction projects.
When Danny Hall and Gordon
Phillips, the civilian and military directors of the U.S. provincial
reconstruction team in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, arrived for a
meeting with Gul Agha Sherzai, the local governor, in mid-June 2007,
they knew that they had a lot of apologizing to do. Philips had to
explain why a covert U.S. military "capture/kill" team named Task Force
373, hunting
for Qari Ur-Rahman, an alleged Taliban commander given the code-name
"Carbon," had called in an AC-130 Spectre gunship and inadvertently
killed seven Afghan police officers in the middle of the night.
The incident vividly demonstrated
the inherent clash between two doctrines in the U.S. war in Afghanistan
-- counterinsurgency ("protecting the people") and counterterrorism
(killing terrorists). Although the Obama administration has given lip
service to the former, the latter has been, and continues to be, the
driving force in its war in Afghanistan.
For Hall, a Foreign Service
officer who was less than two months away from a plush assignment in
London, working with the military had already proven more difficult than
he expected. In an article for Foreign Service Journal published a couple of months before the meeting, he wrote,
"I felt like I never really knew what was going on, where I was
supposed to be, what my role was, or if I even had one. In particular, I
didn't speak either language that I needed: Pashtu or military."
It had been no less awkward for
Phillips. Just a month earlier, he had personally handed over "solatia"
payments -- condolence payments for civilian deaths wrongfully caused by
U.S. forces -- in Governor Sherzai's presence, while condemning the act
of a Taliban suicide bomber who had killed 19 civilians, setting off
the incident in question. "We come here as your guests," he told
the relatives of those killed, "invited to aid in the reconstruction
and improved security and governance of Nangarhar, to bring you a better
life and a brighter future for you and your children. Today, as I look
upon the victims and their families, I join you in mourning for your
loved ones."
Hall and Phillips were in charge
of a portfolio of 33 active U.S. reconstruction projects worth $11
million in Nangarhar, focused on road-building, school supplies, and an
agricultural program aimed at exporting fruits and vegetables from the
province.
Yet the mission of their
military-led "provincial reconstruction team" (made up of civilian
experts, State department officials, and soldiers) appeared to be in
direct conflict with those of the "capture/kill" team of special
operations forces (Navy Seals, Army Rangers, and Green Berets, together
with operatives from the Central Intelligence Agency's Special
Activities Division) whose mandate was to pursue Afghans alleged to be
terrorists as well as insurgent leaders. That team was leaving a trail
of dead civilian bodies and recrimination in its wake.
Details of some of the missions of Task Force 373 first became public as a result of more than 76,000 incident reports leaked to the public by Wikileaks, a whistleblower website, together with analyses of those documents in Der Spiegel, the Guardian, and the New York Times.
A full accounting of the depredations of the task force may be some
time in coming, however, as the Obama administration refuses to comment
on its ongoing assassination spree in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A short
history of the unit can nonetheless be gleaned from a careful reading of
the Wikileaks documents as well as related reports from Afghanistan and
unclassified Special Forces reports.
The Wikileaks data suggests that
as many as 2,058 people on a secret hit list called the "Joint
Prioritized Effects List" (JPEL) were considered "capture/kill" targets
in Afghanistan. A total of 757 prisoners -- most likely from this list
-- were being held at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF), a
U.S.-run prison on Bagram Air Base as of the end of December 2009.
Capture/Kill Operations
The idea of "joint" teams from
different branches of the military working collaboratively with the CIA
was first conceived in 1980 after the disastrous Operation Eagle Claw,
when personnel from the Air Force, Army, and Navy engaged in a
disastrously botched, seat-of-the-pants attempt to rescue U.S. hostages
in Iran with help from the Agency. Eight soldiers were killed when two
helicopters collided in the Iranian desert. Afterwards, a high-level,
six-member commission led by Admiral James L. Holloway, III recommended
the creation of a Joint Special Forces command to ensure that different
branches of the military and the CIA should do far more advance
coordination planning in the future.
This process accelerated greatly after September 11, 2001. That month, a CIA team called Jawbreaker
headed for Afghanistan to plan a U.S.-led invasion of the country.
Shortly thereafter, an Army Green Beret team set up Task Force Dagger to
pursue the same mission. Despite an initial rivalry between the
commanders of the two groups, they eventually teamed up.
The first covert "joint" team
involving the CIA and various military special operations forces to
work together in Afghanistan was Task Force 5, charged with the mission
of capturing or killing "high value targets" like Osama bin Laden,
senior leaders of al-Qaeda, and Mullah Mohammed Omar, the head of the
Taliban. A sister organization set up in Iraq was called Task Force 20.
The two were eventually combined into Task Force 121 by General John
Abizaid, the head of the U.S. Central Command.
In a new book to be released this month, Operation Darkheart,
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer describes the work of Task Force 121
in 2003, when he was serving as part of a team dubbed the Jedi Knights.
Working under the alias of Major Christopher Stryker, he ran
operations for the Defense Intelligence Agency (the military equivalent
of the CIA) out of Bagram Air Base.
One October night, Shaffer was
dropped into a village near Asadabad in Kunar province by an MH-47
Chinook helicopter to lead a "joint" team, including Army Rangers (a
Special Forces division) and 10th Mountain Division troops. They were
on a mission to capture a lieutenant of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a notorious warlord allied with the Taliban, based on information provided by the CIA.
It wasn't easy. "They succeeded
in striking at the core of the Taliban and their safe havens across the
border in Pakistan. For a moment Shaffer saw us winning the war," reads
the promotional material for the book. "Then the military brass got
involved. The policies that top officials relied on were hopelessly
flawed. Shaffer and his team were forced to sit and watch as the
insurgency grew -- just across the border in Pakistan."
Almost a quarter century after
Operation Eagle Claw, Shaffer, who was part of the Able Danger team that
had pursued Al Qaeda in the 1990s, describes the bitter turf wars
between the CIA and Special Forces teams over how the shadowy world of
secret assassinations in Afghanistan and Pakistan should be run.
Task Force 373
Fast forward to 2007, the first
time Task Force 373 is mentioned in the Wikileaks documents. We don’t
know whether its number means anything, but coincidentally or not,
chapter 373 of the U.S. Code 10, the act of Congress that sets out what
the U.S. military is legally allowed to do, permits
the Secretary of Defense to empower any "civilian employee" of the
military "to execute warrants and make arrests without a warrant" in
criminal matters. Whether or not this is indeed the basis for that "373"
remains a classified matter -- as indeed, until the Wikileaks document
dump occurred, was the very existence of the group.
Analysts
say that Task Force 373 complements Task Force 121 by using "white
forces" like the Rangers and the Green Berets, as opposed to the more
secretive Delta Force. Task Force 373 is supposedly run
out of three military bases -- in Kabul, the Afghan capital; Kandahar,
the country’s second largest city; and Khost City near the Pakistani
tribal lands. It’s possible that some of its operations also come out
of Camp Marmal,
a German base in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Sources familiar
with the program say that the task force has its own helicopters and
aircraft, notably AC-130 Spectre gunships, dedicated only to its use.
Its commander appears to have been Brigadier General Raymond Palumbo, based out of the Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Palumbo, however, left
Fort Bragg in mid-July, shortly after General Stanley McChrystal was
relieved as Afghan war commander by President Obama. The name of the new
commander of the task force is not known.
In more than 100 incident reports
in the Wikileaks files, Task Force 373 is described as leading numerous
"capture/kill" efforts, notably in Khost, Paktika, and Nangarhar
provinces, all bordering the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of
northern Pakistan. Some reportedly resulted in successful captures,
while others led to the death of local police officers or even small
children, causing angry villagers to protest and attack U.S.-led
military forces.
In April 2007, David Adams, commander of the Khost provincial reconstruction team, was called to meet
with elders from the village of Gurbuz in Khost province, who were
angry about Task Force 373's operations in their community. The incident
report on Wikileaks does not indicate just what Task Force 373 did to
upset Gurbuz’s elders, but the governor of Khost, Arsala Jamal, had been
publicly complaining about Special Forces operations and civilian
deaths in his province since December 2006, when five civilians were
killed in a raid on Darnami village.
"This is our land," he said
then. "I've been asking with greater force: Let us sit together, we
know our Afghan brothers, we know our culture better. With these
operations we should not create more enemies. We are in a position to
reduce mistakes."
As Adams would later recall in an op-ed he co-authored for the Wall Street Journal, "The increasing number of raids on Afghan homes alienated many of Khost's tribal elders."
On June 12, 2007, Danny Hall and
Gordon Philips, working in Nangarhar province just northeast of Khost,
were called into that meeting with Governor Sherzai to explain how Task
Force 373 had killed those seven local Afghan police officers. Like
Jamal, Sherzai made the point to Hall and Philips that "he strongly
encourages better coordination… and he further emphasized that he does
not want to see this happen again."
Less than a week later, a Task Force 373 team fired
five rockets at a compound in Nangar Khel in Paktika province to the
south of Khost, in an attempt to kill Abu Laith al-Libi, an alleged
al-Qaeda member from Libya. When the U.S. forces made it to the village,
they found that Task Force 373 had destroyed a madrassa (or
Islamic school), killing six children and grievously wounding a seventh
who, despite the efforts of a U.S. medical team, would soon die. (In
late January 2008, al-Libi was reported killed by a Hellfire missile from a Predator drone strike in a village near Mir Ali in North Waziristan in Pakistan.)
Paktika Governor Akram Khapalwak
met with the U.S. military the day after the raid. Unlike his
counterparts in Khost and Nangarhar, Khapalwak agreed to support the
"talking points" developed for Task Force 373 to explain the incident to
the media. According to the Wikileaks incident report, the governor
then "echoed the tragedy of children being killed, but stressed this
could've been prevented had the people exposed the presence of
insurgents in the area."
However, no military talking
points, no matter in whose mouth, could stop the civilian deaths as long
as Task Force 373’s raids continued.
On October 4, 2007, its members called
in an air strike -- 500 pound Paveway bombs -- on a house in the
village of Laswanday, just six miles from Nangar Khel in Paktika
province (where those seven children had already died). This time, four
men, one woman, and a girl -- all civilians -- as well as a donkey, a
dog, and several chickens would be slaughtered. A dozen U.S. soldiers
were injured, but the soldiers reported that not one "enemy" was
detained or killed.
The Missing Afghan Story
Not all raids resulted in
civilian deaths. The U.S. military incident reports released by
Wikileaks suggest that Task Force 373 had better luck in capturing
"targets" alive and avoiding civilian deaths on December 14, 2007. The
503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne) was asked that day to support Task
Force 373 in a search in Paktika province for Bitonai and Nadr, two
alleged al-Qaeda leaders listed on the JPEL. The operation took place
just outside the town of Orgun, close to U.S. Forward Operating Base
(FOB) Harriman. Located 7,000 feet above sea level and surrounded by
mountains, it hosts about 300 soldiers as well as a small CIA compound,
and is often visited by chattering military helicopters well as sleepy
camel herds belonging to local Pashtuns.
An airborne assault team code-named "Operation Spartan"
descended on the compounds where Bitonai and Nadr were supposed to be
living, but failed to find them. When a local Afghan informant told the
Special Forces soldiers that the suspects were at a location about two
miles away, Task Force 373 seized both men as well as 33 others who were
detained at FOB Harriman for questioning and possible transfer to the
prison at Bagram.
But when Task Force 373 was on
the prowl, civilians were, it seems, always at risk, and while the
Wikileaks documents reveal what the U.S soldiers were willing to report,
the Afghan side of the story was often left in a ditch. For example,
on a Monday night in mid-November 2009, Task Force 373 conducted an
operation to capture or kill an alleged militant code-named "Ballentine"
in Ghazni province. A terse incident report announced that one Afghan
woman and four "insurgents" had been killed. The next morning, Task
Force White Eagle, a Polish unit under the command of the U.S. 82nd
Airborne Division, reported that some 80 people gathered to protest the killings.
The window of an armored vehicle was damaged by the angry villagers,
but the documents don’t offer us their version of the incident.
In an ironic twist, one of the
last Task Force 373 incidents recorded in the Wikileaks documents was
almost a reprise of the original Operation Eagle Claw disaster that led
to the creation of the "joint" capture/kill teams. Just before sunrise
on October 26, 2009, two U.S. helicopters, a UH-1 Huey and an AH-1
Cobra, collided near the town of Garmsir in the southern province of Helmand, killing four Marines.
Closely allied with Task Force 373 is a British unit, Task Force 42,
composed of Special Air Service, Special Boat Service, and Special
Reconnaissance Regiment commandos who operate in Helmand province and
are mentioned in several Wikileaks incident reports.
Manhunting
"Capture/kill" is a key part of a
new military "doctrine" developed by the Special Forces Command
established after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw. Under the
leadership of General Bryan D. Brown, who took over the Special Forces Command in September 2003, the doctrine came to be known as F4, which stood for
"find, fix, finish, and follow-up" -- a slightly euphemistic but not
hard to understand message about how alleged terrorists and insurgents
were to be dealt with.
Under Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld in the Bush years, Brown began setting up "joint Special
Forces" teams to conduct F4 missions outside war zones. These were
given the anodyne name "Military Liaison Elements." At least one killing
by such a team in Paraguay (of an armed robber not on any targeting
list) was written up by New York Times reporters
Scott Shane and Thom Shanker. The team, whose presence had not been
made known to the U.S. ambassador there, was ordered to leave the
country.
"The number-one requirement is to
defend the homeland. And so sometimes that requires that you find and
capture or kill terrorist targets around the world that are trying to do
harm to this nation," Brown told
the House Committee on Armed Services in March 2006. "Our foreign
partners… are willing but incapable nations that want help in building
their own capability to defend their borders and eliminate terrorism in
their countries or in their regions." In April 2007, President Bush
rewarded Brown's planning by creating
a special high-level office at the Pentagon for an assistant secretary
of defense for special operations/low-intensity conflict and
interdependent capabilities.
Michael G. Vickers, made famous in the book and film Charlie Wilson's War as the architect of the covert arms-and-money supply chain to the mujaheedin in the CIA’s anti-Soviet Afghan campaign of the 1980s, was nominated to fill the position. Under his leadership, a new directive
was issued in December 2008 to "develop capabilities for extending U.S.
reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with
and through indigenous foreign forces or by conducting low visibility
operations." In this way, the "capture/kill" program was
institutionalized in Washington.
"The war on terror is
fundamentally an indirect war… It's a war of partners… but it also is a
bit of the war in the shadows, either because of political sensitivity
or the problem of finding terrorists," Vickers told the Washington Post
as 2007 ended. "That's why the Central Intelligence Agency is so
important… and our Special Operations forces play a large role."
George W. Bush's departure from
the White House did not dampen the enthusiasm for F4. Quite the
contrary: even though the F4 formula has recently been tinkered with,
in typical military fashion, and has now become "find, fix, finish,
exploit, and analyze," or F3EA, President Obama has, by all accounts,
expanded military intelligence gathering and "capture/kill" programs
globally in tandem with an escalation of drone-strike operations by the CIA.
There are quite a few outspoken
supporters of the "capture/kill" doctrine. Columbia University Professor
Austin Long is one academic who has jumped on
the F3EA bandwagon. Noting its similarity to the Phoenix assassination
program, responsible for tens of thousands of deaths during the U.S. war
in Vietnam (which he defends), he has called for a shrinking of the
U.S. military "footprint" in Afghanistan to 13,000 Special Forces troops
who would focus exclusively on counter-terrorism, particularly
assassination operations. "Phoenix suggests that intelligence
coordination and the integration of intelligence with an action arm can
have a powerful effect on even extremely large and capable armed
groups," he and his co-author William Rosenau wrote in a July 2009 Rand Institute monograph entitled" "The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency."
Others are even more aggressively
inclined. Lieutenant George Crawford, who retired from the position of
"lead strategist" for the Special Forces Command to go work for
Archimedes Global, Inc., a Washington consulting firm, has suggested
that F3EA be replaced by one term: "Manhunting." In a monograph published by the Joint Special Operations University in September 2009, "Manhunting:
Counter-Network Organization for Irregular Warfare," Crawford spells
out "how to best address the responsibility to develop manhunting as a
capability for American national security."
Killing the Wrong People
The strange evolution of these
concepts, the creation of ever more global hunter-killer teams whose
purpose in life is assassination 24/7, and the civilians these "joint
Special Forces" teams regularly kill in their raids on supposed "targets" have unsettled even military experts.
For example, Christopher Lamb,
the acting director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at
the National Defense University, and Martin Cinnamond, a former U.N.
official in Afghanistan, penned an article for the Spring 2010 issue of
the Joint Forces Quarterly in which they wrote:
"There is broad agreement… that the indirect approach to
counterinsurgency should take precedence over kill/capture operations.
However, the opposite has occurred."
Other military types claim that
the hunter-killer approach is short-sighted and counterproductive. "My
take on Task Force 373 and other task forces, it has a purpose because
it keeps the enemy off balance. But It does not understand the
fundamental root cause of the conflict, of why people are supporting the
Taliban," says Matthew Hoh, a former Marine and State Department
contractor who resigned from the government last September. Hoh, who
often worked with Task Force 373 as well as other Special Forces
"capture/kill" programs in Afghanistan and Iraq, adds: "We are killing
the wrong people, the mid-level Taliban who are only fighting us because
we are in their valleys. If we were not there, they would not be
fighting the U.S."
Task Force 373 may be a nightmare
for Afghans. For the rest of us -- now that Wikileaks has flushed it
into the open -- it should be seen as a symptom of deeper policy
disasters. After all, it raises a basic question: Is this country
really going to become known as a global Manhunters, Inc.?
Pratap Chatterjee is a freelance journalist, TomDispatch regular,
and senior editor at CorpWatch who has worked extensively in the Middle
East and Central Asia, including nine trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Iraq. He has written two books about the war on terror: Iraq, Inc. (Seven Stories Press, 2004) and Halliburton's Army (Nation Books, 2009). He recommends using DiaryDig to better understand the WikiLeaks Afghan War Diary. A good glossary of military acronyms can be found by clicking here. You can contact him via email at pchatterjee@igc.org.
Copyright 2010 Pratap Chatterjee